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ESSAYS ON MACROECONOMICS
Yang Zhao, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2007
This dissertation consists of two chapters on di¤erent topics in macroeconomics. The rst
chapter studies the economic e¤ect of privately-issued banking notes (private money). I
build a model in which money is divisible and price is endogenous. The model is based on
Lagos and Wrights model (Lagos and Wright, 2005). The analysis shows that the private
banknotes serve as short term credit for bankers. Given that the Friedman rule, which
suggests a deationary monetary policy, is not available, privately-issued banking notes
improve resource allocation in the economy. The welfare improvement is not restricted to
bankers. Nonbankers also enjoy welfare improvement. The paper o¤ers new insight into
the historical role of privately-issued banknotes. The second chapter is based on a paper co-
authored with Ying Fang, who was my fellow graduate student at the University of Pittsburgh
and now is a professor at Xiamen University. In this chapter we use crossing-city data to
estimate the e¤ect of property rights protection on Chinas economic performance. We adopt
the historical enrollments of Protestant lower primary schools in the early 20th century as
the instrumental variable for current property rights protection in China. Our ndings
about property rights protection in China resemble the cross-country research by Paulo
Mauro (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), and Acemoglu et al (2001). We nd that property
rights protection dominates others potential determinants of economic performance, such as
geography or government policy.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Money is at the core of modern macroeconomics. Many research e¤orts have been devoted
to modelling the economy with money as the medium of exchange. However, an analytical
model of private money with both endogenous prices and divisibility is still in lack. The
rst of the two chapters in this dissertation lls this gap. I build a model of privately-
issued money in which money is divisible and price is endogenous. The model is based on
Lagos and Wrights model (Lagos and Wright, 2005). The analysis shows that the private
banknotes serve as short term credit for bankers. Given that the Friedman rule, which
suggests a deationary monetary policy, is not available, privately-issued banking notes
improve resource allocation in the economy. The welfare improvement is not restricted to
bankers. Nonbankers also enjoy welfare improvement. The paper o¤ers new insight into the
historical role of privately-issued banknotes.
The second chapter is based on a paper co-authored with Ying Fang, who was my fellow
graduate student at the University of Pittsburgh and now is a professor at Xiamen University.
In this chapter we use crossing-city data to estimate the e¤ect of property rights protection
on Chinas economic performance. We adopt the historical enrollments of Protestant lower
primary schools in the early 20th century as the instrumental variable for current property
rights protection in China. Our ndings about property rights protection in China resemble
the cross-country research by Paulo Mauro (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), and Acemoglu et
al (2001). We nd that property rights protection dominates others potential determinants
of economic performance, such as geography or government policy.
This dissertation reects my diversied interest in macroeconomics. Hereby I acknowl-
edge all members in my dissertation committee. I want to thank my co-advisors, Professor
Thomas Rawski and Professor Ted Temzelides. Without their continuous guidances, the dis-
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sertation would have been less interesting, less precise and much less readable. I also thank
Professor Marla Ripoll, Professor John Du¤y and Professor David DeJong for their warm-
hearted encouragement and invaluable advice on my research. Professor Esther Gal-Or and
Professor James Feigenbaum have provided very helpful comments on both chapters. I also
want to thank Professor Ying Fang, who is my coauthor and my friend. My old friend from
Fudan University, Professor Zheng Song has provided insightful comments on both chapters
and pointed out one error in the earlier draft of the rst chapter. I want to also thank
Professor Daniel Berkowitz, Professor Mehmet Caner, Professor Alexis Leon and Professor
Mark L. Hoekstra for helpful comments on the chapter on Chinas institutions.
I am responsible for all the errors in this dissertation.
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2.0 DIVISIBLE PRIVATE MONEY WITH ENDOGENOUS PRICES IN A
RANDOM MATCHING MODEL
2.1 INTRODUCTION
When memory, or a record of every agents trading history is absent, money can be seen
as a substitute for memory (Kocherlakota, 1996). However, it is not a perfect substitute
for memory. Typically, in the random matching model, where money is essential for its
function as medium of exchange, the monetary equilibrium is ine¢ cient. The ine¢ ciency is
mainly due to the discount factor. When a seller (producer) accepts money in exchange, he is
essentially holding money for future consumption. The optimization of the producer leads the
production at the level equals todays marginal production cost with the discounted marginal
utility from tomorrows consumption. With positive discount rate, the sellers marginal cost
is then less than the buyers marginal utility, which means the production is lower than the
e¢ cient level. It might be more intuitive to understand this ine¢ ciency from the sellers
point of view. If the discount rate is positive, accepting and holding money means a utility
discount for a producer since he is holding money for tomorrows consumption. In order to
compensate this future utility discount from holding money, the producer then would prefer
to produce less than the e¢ cient level.
Friedman (1969) suggested a policy of deation to x this ine¢ ciency. When prices keep
declining, the producers future utility discount from holding money can be compensated
by the higher future value of money. Thus, the producer will increase production to the
e¢ cient level. However, it might be di¢ cult to perform the Friedman rule when the monetary
authority cannot decrease the stock of money as it wishes, which was the case for the era
before the government has a monopoly in money creation. In U.S. before 1914 when private
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money was also used, it might be impossible for the monetary authority to decrease the stock
of money in circulation. In that case, the Friedman rule might not be feasible.
Since the rst best allocation is not obtainable without the Friedman rule, we ask the
question: Is there any alternative to be potentially welfare improving when the Friedman
rule is di¢ cult to follow? The answer is Yes. We show that 100% backed-up bank notes can
serve this purpose1. Thus, this paper o¤ers an explanation for the historical role of private
money. In the history of banking, note issue preceded and outweighed deposit contracts as
the main banking business. Walter Bagehot argued that note issue served as a subsidy for a
banker to start the business (1873, Chapter III). It seems that note issue o¤ered the earlier-
days bankers some welfare gain. However, this welfare gain has yet to be fully understood
from the point of view of modern monetary and banking theory.
Recently, monetary theory has focused on a random matching model with frictions on
trade, in which money is essential because of its function as a medium of exchange (Kiyotaki
and Wright, 1989). To study the behavior of agents in such a model is di¢ cult. The di¢ culty
lies in that there is no typical individual in the model. Since the state of an agent (his money
holdings) is a random walk in the model due to the random matching, it is hard to follow
the dynamics of the distribution of money holdings among agents. This is why for a long
time in this line of literature money was modeled as indivisible that people hold either one
or zero unit of money (Trejos and Wright, 1995; Shi, 1995).
Several e¤orts have been exerted to get around the problem by introducing some mech-
anism to derive the degeneration of the distribution of money holdings. Shi (1997) used
the redistribution of money holdings within the family to make the distribution of money
holdings in the population degenerate. Recently, Lagos and Wright (2005, referred as LW
hereafter) developed a model with a centralized market in addition to the decentralized
market. Under quasi-linear utility, the distribution of money holdings degenerates when
individuals exit the centralized market. Money is assumed to be divisible in the model, but
at the end of day agents will choose the same quantity of money holding and use money as
"indivisible" in the pairwise exchange : the seller will charge the entire amount of money
that the buyer owns.
1We call the bank notes private money, rather than inside money.
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In this paper we introduce private money into the LW model and study its e¤ect on the
welfare. As for the behavior of bankers, we expand the analysis by Cavalcanti, Erosa and
Temzelides (1999) from the indivisible case into the divisible case. Basically, the bankers are
similar to those of National Banking System (referred as NBS hereafter). Bankers can issue
their own money, or bank notes, under the requirement of 100% reserves. We assume that
private money is divisible in the set R+: The quasi-linear utility function will guarantee the
degeneration of the distribution of money holdings among nonbankers and will lead to no
excess reserves among bankers. Therefore we can solve the model analytically.
To our knowledge this is the rst e¤ort to introduce private money into the LWmodel. We
nd that, given that the Friedman rule is not attainable, the introduction of private money
improves the allocation. The gain in welfare comes from the relaxed liquidity constraint of
bankers due to private money. The role of private money in this model is essentially a kind
of credit available only to bankers. Since nowadays the e-cach technology provides a similar
monetary environment to private money, the welfare improving result of this paper could
help us understand current monetary environment as well.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environment. Section
3 describes the problems faced by the agents in the model. In section 4 we characterize
equilibrium. Section 5 analyzes the welfare e¤ects of private money. Section 6 serves as
concluding remarks.
2.2 THE ENVIRONMENT
2.2.1 Dual Markets
The economy has a continuum population normalized as having measure 1. Time is discrete.
Agents live forever, with discount factor  2 (0; 1) between two successive periods. For
every period in the economy, there are two di¤erent markets successive in time: the daytime
market and night market. There is no discount between day and night within one period.
During the daytime, people consume and produce di¤erent types of goods. The population
is equally divided into k types (k  3). The ith type agents consume only the ith type goods
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and produce only i+1th type goods. The kth type agents produce 1st type of goods. Agents
are randomly matched in pairs. There is no double-coincidence. The daytime market is the
decentralized one, where the individuals meet through random matching and bargain.
The night market is the competitive centralized market, where everyone consumes and
produces a uniform good. We assume that the production technology is one-to-one in both
markets for simplicity, i.e. one unit of labor produces one unit of goods. In order to get
the degeneration of the distribution of money holdings among individuals, we need to have
linearity in one market. Here we assume that utility is negatively linear in the labor supply
on the night market.
As in LW, the individual preferences can be summarized by the following utility function:
U(x; h;X;H) = u(x)  c(h) + U(X) H; (2.1)
where x and h (X and H) denote the quantity of goods consumed labor provided on the
daytime (night) market respectively, u() and U() denote the utility from consumption at
daytime and night respectively, c() denotes the utility loss from daytime labor provision.
We assume that there exists q such that u0(q) = c0(q), X such that U 0(X) = 1: Notice
that q is the e¢ cient quantity of consumption and production on the day market.
2.2.2 Money and Banking
There is at (outside) money in the economy without intrinsic value. The initial stock of
money isM . Later we will see that the initial distribution of outside money does not matter
for our result. However, here we just arbitrarily assume that outside money is initially
distributed equally among all agents.
A fraction of each type of agents are bankers, denoted as  (0 <  < 1). Like other
agents, bankers consume and produce in both markets. Bankers can issue their own banking
notes as private money. We assume that note issue belongs to the set of non-negative
real numbers R+ in both markets. There is a 100% reserve condition stated as: Every
bankers reserves should be no less than his out-oating notes in circulation when he exits
the night market. The reserves could be in the form of outside money or notes issued by
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other bankers. We use this condition to mimic the 100% collateral requirement during the
NBS. NBS required the 100% collateral to be built in advance to note issuing. Our bankers
are temporarily allowed to hold a negative net assets during the interval between the day
market and the night market, as long as they rebuild their reserve to meet the 100% reserve
at the end of the period. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the cost for bankers to
issue notes is zero and that reserves bear no interest. There is a clearing house which serves
as a book-keeper only for its members (bankers). The clearing house tracks each bankers
reserves, r; and her oating notes in circulation, n: Since the goal of the model is not to
study individuals di¤erent preferences between outside money and inside money, we simply
assume that nonbankers treat outside money and inside money indi¤erently. There are two
forms of assets that can be used as reserves by a banker: outside money or notes issued by
other bankers.
During the interval after the daytime market and before the night market there is a
clearing process, which takes place according to following rule: First, only clearing house
members, i.e., bankers, can redeem the banking notes. Second, when banker A redeems a
note issued by banker B, banker As reserve increases by 1, meanwhile, banker Bs oating
notes and reserves both decrease by 1. We assume that whenever a banker receives the note
issued by other bankers she will redeem it as soon as possible.
For each period, events take place according to the following schedule:
period t: day market matching (decentralized market) ! redemption (clearing
house) ! night market (centralized market)!period t+1.
2.3 THE MODEL
2.3.1 Nonbankers
A bankers state can be summarized by her account with the clearing house (r; n); where r is
his reserves and n is his outside oating notes. A nonbankers state is her money holdings m
(including both outside and inside money). In the decentralized market, agents bargain over
the quantity and the nominal price of the goods during exchange. The bargaining problem
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is solved by studying the Nash solution. In the centralized market nonbankers decide on
consumption, labor supply and money to bring into the next day market, taking the price as
given. The bankers, in addition to labor supply and consumption, choose reserves and note
issuing for the next day, so as to maximize utility subject to the budget constraint and the
reserve ratio requirement, taking as given the same price in the centralized market.
On the day time market, each individual is with probability 1
k
in a meeting with a person
who can produce the good he needs, and with probability 1
k
meeting with a person who can
consume the good he produces. Finally, with probability 1  2
k
he is in a no-single-coincidence
meeting. At the beginning of bargaining, agents know whether their opponent is a banker
or a nonbanker and the state of their opponent.
Let Ft(m) denote the distribution of money holdings ( both outside and inside money
) among nonbankers before trade in the decentralized market. Let Jt(r; n) denote the joint
distribution of reserves and notes oating in the circulation for a banker when he enters the
decentralized market. Let V Nt (m) and W
N
t (m) denote the value functions for a nonbanker
who holds money m in the day and night markets respectively. The value function for a
nonbanker when he enters the day market can be written as follows:
V Nt (m) =
1
k
(1  )
Z
fu[qNNt (m; em)] +WNt [m  dNNt (m; em)]gdFt(em)
+
1
k

Z
fu[qNBt (m; er; en)] +WNt [m  dNBt (m; er; en)]gdJt(er; en)
+
1
k
(1  )
Z
f c[qNNt (em;m)] +WNt [m+ dNNt (em;m)]gdFt(em)
+
1
k

Z
f c[qBNt (m; er; en)] +WNt [m+ dBNt (m; er; en)]gdJt(er; en)
+(1  2
k
)WNt (m); (2.2)
where qij (i; j 2 fN;Bg) and dij (i; j 2 fN;Bg) stand for the quantity of goods and money
exchanged, respectively, when the buyer is i and seller is j: N denotes a nonbanker and B
denotes a banker. In our model, qij (i; j 2 fN;Bg) and dij (i; j 2 fN;Bg) are determined
by bargaining and in general are functions of the states of the two parties in the meeting.
However, we will show in Lemma 2 that they are only determined by the buyers state. For a
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nonbanker, there could be ve possible cases. The rst line of the right hand side of equation
(2.2) describes the case of meeting a nonbanker seller, the second line of meeting a banker
seller, the third line is the case of meeting a nonbanker buyer, the fourth line is the case to
meet a banker buyer, and the last line describes the case of no coincidence.
On the night market, a nonbanker faces the following problem:
WNt (m) = maxfX;H;m0g
fU(X) H + V Nt+1(m0)g
s.t. X = H + t(m m0); (2.3)
where t is the price of money/banking note in the night market. Substitute H using the
budget constraint into the objective function in (2.3) and apply the rst order condition with
respect to X. We then obtain:
WNt (m) = U(X
) X + tm+maxfm0gf tm
0 + V Nt+1(m
0)g: (2.4)
Notice that the value function is linear in money holdings.
2.3.2 Bankers
Let Dt(r; n); St(r; n) and Lt(r; n) denote the value function for the bankers while entering the
daytime market, the clearing house and the night market respectively. The value function
of a banker entering the daytime market is
Dt(r; n) =
1
k
(1  )
Z
fu[qBNt (em; r; n)] + St[r; n+ dBNt (em; r; n)]gdFt(em)
+
1
k

Z
fu[qBBt (r; n; er; en)] + St[r   dBBt (r; n; er; en); n]gdJt(er; en)
+
1
k
(1  )
Z
f c[qNBt (em; r; n)] + St[r + dNBt (em; r; n); n]gdFt(em)
+
1
k

Z
f c[qBBt (er; en; r; n)] + St[r + dBBt (er; en; r; n); n]gdJt(er; en)
+(1  2
k
)St(r; n): (2.5)
There are also ve possible cases for a banker on the daytime market match: meet a non-
banker seller, which is described by the rst line on the right hand side of equation (2.5), a
banker seller by the second line, a nonbanker buyer by the third line, a banker buyer by the
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fourth line, and no coincidence by the last line. St(r; n) is the value function for a banker
entering the clearing process:
St(r; n) =
Z n
0
Lt(r   x; n  x)dt(x); (2.6)
where t(x) is the probability distribution function of the bankers notes that is to be
redeemed during the coming-up redemption process. This distribution is endogenously de-
termined by the model. However, later we will nd that it is not necessary to know the
specic form of this distribution to characterize the equilibrium. In Lemma 1 we show that
the equilibrium for the banker only depends on her excess reserves. Since when a note is
redeemed, both reserves and notes are decreased by the same amount, the excess reserves of
a banker are not a¤ected by the redemptions. Also, since we assume that bankers must meet
the 100% reserve requirement, the number of notes redeemed will not a¤ect the bankers
status to satisfy this requirement. Hence, the unknown distribution function t(x) does not
matter when we characterize the equilibrium.
The value function for a banker who enters the night market can be written as follows:
Lt(r; n) = maxfX;H;r0;n0g
fU(X) H + V Bt+1(r0; n0)g
s.t. X = H + t(n
0   n+ r   r0)
r0  n0: (2.7)
Notice that bankers are allowed to hold negative reserves during the interval between re-
demption and the night market. However, they must rebuild their reserves to meet the
reserve ratio requirement of r0  n0 when they exit the night market.
Lemma 1. The bankersvalue function can be written as a function of his excess reserves
only, re; where re  r   n:
Proof. We rst prove that the value function in the night market is a function of excess
reserves. Then we prove the value function for entering the clearing house is a function of
excess reserves. Finally, we show that the day market value function is only related excess
reserves.
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In the night market, the rst order conditions imply that X = X. Substituting the
budget constraint into object function for (2.7), we have
Lt(r; n) = U(X
) X + t(r   n) + maxfr0;n0gf t(r
0   n0) + Dt+1(r0; n0)g: (2.8)
Notice that the value function is a linear function of the excess reserves, r   n, and the
decision of fr0; n0g does not depend on current state. We then can rewrite the value function
as:
WBt (r
e)  Lt(r; n)
= U(X) X + t(r   n) + maxfr0;n0gf t(r
0   n0) + Dt+1(r0; n0)g
= U(X) X + t(re) + maxfr0;n0gf t(r
e0) + Dt+1(r0; n0)g: (2.9)
Then St can be written as
St(r; n) =
Z n
0
Lt(r   x; n  x)dt(x)
=
Z n
0
WBt (r
e)dt(x)
= WBt (r
e): (2.10)
Notice that the distribution of redeemed note does not enter the value function. Substituting
the St(r; n) into the day market value function, we obtain
Dt(r; n) =
1
k
(1  )
Z
fu[qBNt (em; r; n)] +WBt [re   dBNt (em; r; n)]gdFt(em)
+
1
k

Z
fu[qBBt (r; n; er; en)] +WBt [re   dBBt (r; n; er; en)]gdJt(er; en)
+
1
k
(1  )
Z
f c[qNBt (em; r; n)] +WBt [re + dNBt (em; r; n)]gdFt(em)
+
1
k

Z
f c[qBBt (er; en; r; n)] +WBt [re + dBBt (er; en; r; n)]gdJt(er; en)
+(1  2
k
)WBt (r
e): (2.11)
We will show in Lemma 2 that fqIJt ; dIJt g depends only on buyers money holdings, m; or
excess reserves, re, so we can rewrite the bankers day market value function as
Dt(r; n)  V Bt (re): (2.12)
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Thus, the bankers problem can be written as
V Bt (r
e) =
1
k
(1  )
Z
fu[qBNt (em; r; n)] +WBt [re   dBNt (em; r; n)]gdFt(em)
+
1
k

Z
fu[qBBt (r; n; er; en)] +WBt [re   dBBt (r; n; er; en)]gdJt(er; en)
+
1
k
(1  )
Z
f c[qNBt (em; r; n)] +WBt[re + dNBt (em; r; n)]gdFt(em)
+
1
k

Z
f c[qBBt (er; en; r; n)] +WBt [re + dBBt (er; en; r; n)]gdJt(er; en)
+(1  2
k
)WBt (r
e) (2.13)
and
WBt (r
e) = U(X) X + tremaxfre0gf tr
e0 + V Bt+1(r
e0)g
s.t. re0  0: (2.14)
Since q and d are functions of only buyers money holding or excess reserves as shown in
Lemma 2, the bankersvalue functions are reduced to functions of re:
The result can greatly simplify our analysis of the equilibrium of the model. The intuition
for the lemma is quite direct. The value of being a banker is determined by how many assets
(reserves) the banker has in his account in the clearing house and how many liabilities (notes)
he has in circulation. More reserves means a higher value for the banker, while more notes
in circulation means a lower value for the banker. Since we assume that there is no interest
return on reserves and no cost to issue the notes, it is not the absolute level of assets and
liabilities but the net assets that really counts.
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2.3.3 The Bargaining Problem
There are four cases for bargaining: a) nonbanker buyer vs. nonbanker seller; b) nonbanker
buyer vs. banker seller; c) banker buyer vs. nonbanker seller; d) banker buy vs. banker
seller. The bargaining terms are determined as the Nash solution to the following problems:
max
fqNNt ;dNNt g
fu(qNNt ) +WNt (m  dNNt ) WNt (m)g (2.15)
f c(qt) +WNt (em+ dNNt ) Wt(em)g1 
max
fqNBt ;dNBt g
fu(qNBt ) +WNt (m  dNBt ) WNt (m)g (2.16)
f c(qNBt ) +WBt (ere + dNBt ) WBt (ere)g1 
max
fqBNt ;dBNt g
fu(qBNt ) +WBt (re   dBNt ) WBt (re)g (2.17)
f c(qBNt ) +WNt (em+ dBNt ) WNt (em)g1 
max
fqBBt ;dBBt g
fu(qBBt ) +WBt (re   dBBt ) WBt (re)g (2.18)
f c(qBBt ) +WBt (ere + dBBt ) WBt (ere)g1 
where  is the bargaining power of the buyers.
The di¢ culty in solving the model lies in that the state of each agent could be variant.
Since whether an agent is a producer or a consumer or a nobody in the meeting is entirely
random, the money holdings of nonbankers or the excess reserves of bankers could change
following a random walk. This makes the bargaining problem (2.15)-(2.18) intractable.
However, if both the distribution of nonbankers money holdings and that of bankers excess
reserves are degenerate, then we can solve the bargaining problem. Linearity of preferences
and linearity of the technology in the night market leads these distributions to be degenerate.
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2.4 EQUILIBRIUM
2.4.1 Denition of Equilibrium
Denition 2. The equilibrium of the model is dened by a path of
fV Nt (m);WNt (m); V Bt (re);WBt (re); Xt; Ht;m0t; re0t ; qijt ; dijt ; t; Ft; Jtg1t=0;
where V Nt (m) is the value function for a nonbanker in the day market, W
N
t (m) is the value
function for a nonbanker in the night market, V Bt (r
e) is the value function for a banker in
the day market, and WBt (r
e) is the function for a banker in the night market, Xt and Ht are
the individuals decision on consumption and production in the night market, m0t and r
e0
t are
nonbankersdecision on money holdings and bankersdecision on reserve management when
they exit the night market, qijt and d
ij
t describe for terms of the trade in the day market, t is
the price of money (hence 1=t is the price of general goods) in the night market, Ft and Jt
are the distribution of money holdings and the joint distribution of reserves and notes before
the matching.
The conditions for equilibrium in such an economy are as follows. For each period t:
(i) V Nt (m);W
N
t (m); V
B
t (r
e);WBt (r
e) satisfy (2.2),(2.3),(2.13) and (2.14);
(ii) given results of bargaining in the day market fqijt ; dijt g, the price in the night market
t, and the distributions Ft and Jt, individuals solve their dynamic problems (2.2-2.4 for
nonbankers and (2.13)-(2.14) for bankers), determining the money holdingmt; excess reserve
management ret ; and setting night consumption X = X
, production H subject to budget
constraint;
(iii) given the path of prices in the night market t and individuals state mt; r
e
t ; the path
of qijt ; d
ij
t solve the bargaining problem (2.15)-(2.18) in each period;
(iv) t > 0; i.e., we focus on monetary equilibrium;
(v) at the end of every period, the total nancial assets equal the original stock of moneyZ
mdFt(m) +
Z
redJt(r; n) =M ;
(vi) the distributions Ft; Jt are consistent with the evolution of money holdings and
reserves and notes implied by trade in both markets and the random redemption process.
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2.4.2 Characterizing the Equilibrium
With the result in Lemma 1, the bargaining problem can be greatly simplied. Substitute
(2.4) and (2.14) into the bargaining problem, to get:
max
fqNNt ;dNNt g
[u(qNNt )  tdNNt )]  [ c(qt) + tdNNt ]1 
max
fqNBt ;dNBt g
[u(qNBt ) + td
NB
t ]
  [ c(qNBt ) + tdNBt ]1 
max
fqBNt ;dBNt g
[u(qBNt )  tdBNt ]  [ c(qBNt ) + tdBNt ]1 
max
fqBBt ;dBBt g
[u(qBBt )  tdBBt )]  [ c(qBBt ) + tdBBt ]1 
In general there are four combinations of banker-nonbanker and producer-buyer match-
ing. However, it does not matter from the point of view of a buyer whether the seller is a
bank or nonbanker. Banker and nonbanker producers are the same in regards to production
technology and bargaining power. Therefore, for a seller, whether he is a banker or non-
banker does not matter for bargaining. However, from the viewpoint of a seller, whether
the buyer is a banker or a nonbanker does make a di¤erence in that the nonbanker buyer
may be subject to the cash constraint while the banker is not. So we can summarize the
four bargaining cases into two: i) the buyer is a nonbanker ; ii) the buyer is a banker. The
bargaining problem turns to follows:
max
fqNt ;dNt g
GN = [u(qNt )  tdNt ]  [ c(qNt ) + tdNt ]1  (2.19)
max
fqB ;dBg
GB = fu(qBt )  tdBt g  f c[qBt ] + tdBt g1 ; (2.20)
where fqit; ditg denote the quantity and the price of the exchange when buyer is a nonbanker
(i = N) or a banker (i = B).
Lemma 3. The solution of (2.19) is
qNt =
bqt(m) if m < mt
q if m  mt
and dNt =

m if m < mt
m if m  mt
(2.21)
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where bqt(m) solves tm = z(q) with
z(q) =
c(q)u0(q) + (1  )u(q)c0(q)
u0(q) + (1  )c0(q) (2.22)
and mt = z(q
)=t: The solution for (2.20) is
qBt = q
; and dBt = m

t , [c(q) + (1  )u(q)] = t: (2.23)
Proof. The rst order conditions for problem (2.19) are:
@GN
@qt
= 0 : [ c(qt) + tdt]u0(qt) = (1  )[u(qt)  tdt]c0(qt) (2.24)
@GN
@dt
= 0 : [ c(qt) + tdt] = (1  )[u(qt)  tdt]: (2.25)
Immediately from above conditions we obtain u0(qt) = c0(qt), thus qt = q with q satisfying
u0(q) = c0(q). Then from (2.24) we have
dt = [c(q
) + (1  )u(q)] = t:
The right hand side is just m.
For a nonbanker buyer, there are two possible cases: his money holdings are greater than
m or less than it. If the buyers money holdings are greater than m, i.e., he is not cash
constrained, then q and m are the solution. If the buyer holds less money than m, then
the solution for qt is given by (2.24) with dt equals the total money holdings of the buyer.
For a banker buyer, since he can issue his own banking note, there is no cash constraint
for him. Hence, the solution is just as (2.23): qBt = q
; and dBt = m

t = [c(q
) + (1  
)u(q)] = t:
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This lemma is exactly the same as the result in LW. The results can be intuitively
explained by some threshold strategy followed by the seller in bargaining. First, the seller
observes the buyers identity (nonbanker or banker) and his state (money holdings or excess
reserves). If the buyer is a nonbanker, the seller will set a threshold of money holdings which
equals m. When the buyers money holdings are greater than m, the seller produces q
and charges m to the buyer. When the buyers money holdings are less than m, the seller
will under-produce, the quantity determined by tm = z(qt), and charge all the buyer has,
m. If the buyer is a banker, then the buyer will not be constrained by the threshold, since
a banker can issue notes.
Notice that tm = z(qt(m)) implies the following result
q0t(m) = t=z
0(qt): (2.26)
Proposition 4. The distribution of bankersexcess reserves degenerates to 0.
Proof. Substitute (2.23) into (2.13) , we can rewrite the bankers value function in the form
similar to (2.32):
V Bt (r
e) = vBt (r
e) + tr
e +max
re0
f tre0 + V Bt+1(re0)g; (2.27)
where
vBt (r
e) =
1
k
u(q)  1
k
(1  )tm  
1
k
c(q)
+
1
k
(1  )
Z
f c[qt(em)] + t emgdFt(em)
+U(X) X: (2.28)
By repeated substitution we have
V Bt (r
e) = vBt (r
e) + tr
e +
1X
j=t
max
rej+1
f jrej+1 + [vBj+1(rej+1) + j+1rej+1]g: (2.29)
Notice that vB0(re) = 0; thus the necessary condition for a monetary equilibrium to exist is
that +1 > : As in LW, minimum ination for a monetary equilibrium is in accordance
with the Friedman rule. Under such condition, we have ret+1 = 0:
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The result of this proposition is quite intuitive. The usage of holding excess reserves
for a banker is only in order to prepare for the day market payment in case he meets a
right exchange partner who can o¤er the type of good he consumes. Meanwhile, holding
excess reserves implies a utility loss in the night market due to discounting. Then, consider
the following strategy. The bankers hold zero excess reserves when exiting tonights market,
issue notes in tomorrows day market when necessary, and recover the notes with tomorrows
night market production. This way bankers actually enjoy a credit from issuing notes. For
bankers, this result is obviously better than holding positive excess reserves since there is no
utility loss from discounting.
However, nonbankers cannot enjoy such credit and are still subject to positive money
holding. Analogously to LW, we can show the following proposition.
Proposition 5. The distribution of nonbankersmoney holding degenerates to M=(1  ):
Proof. The proof of the degeneration is similar to that of LW. Substitute (2.21) and (2.2)
into nonbankers value function (1), to get
V Nt (m) =
1
k
fu[qNt (m)]  tmg (2.30)
+
1
k
(1  )
Z
f c[qNt (em)] + t emgdFt(em)
+
1
k
[ c(q) + tm]
+WNt (m):
Let
vNt (mt) =
1
k
fu[qNt (m)]  tdNt (m)g (2.31)
+
1
k
(1  )
Z
f c[qNt (em)] + t emgdFt(em)
+
1
k
[ c(q) + tm] + U(X) X;
then
V Nt (m) = v
N
t (mt) + tm+max
m0
f tm0 + V Nt+1(m0)g: (2.32)
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By repeated substitutions, we have
V Nt (m) = v
N
t (m) + tm+
1X
j=t
max
mj+1
f jmj+1 + [vNj+1(mj+1) + j+1mj+1]g: (2.33)
Note that V Nt (m) has exactly the same form as in LW. The distribution of money holding
among nonbankers degenerates. Since bankers do not hold any excess reserves, and the total
stock of money in the economy is M , the money holding of every nonbanker is M=(1  ):
Now we can summarize the results. Every nonbanker chooses M=(1  ) as his optimal
money holdings when exiting the night market. In the day market, nonbankers will pay all
their cash if they meet a right type of seller. Bankers all choose to hold no excess reserves
when exiting the night market. When they meet the right seller in the day market, they
issue m amount of notes and consume q amount of goods.
2.4.3 The Steady State
The dynamic problem for nonbankers has been described by (2.33), from which we can
directly derive the rst order condition for nonbankers:
t = [v
N 0
t+1(mt+1) + t+1]: (2.34)
Notice that the function vNt+1(mt+1) is just one period lag of (2.31). Taking the derivative of
(2.31), we have
vN 0t (m) =
1
k
fu0[qNt (m)]qN 0t (m)  tg: (2.35)
Substituting mt+1 =M=(1  ) and (2.35) into the rst order condition (2.34), we have
t = f
1
k
u0[qNt+1(
M
1  )]q
0
t+1(
M
1  ) + (1 
1
k
)t+1g: (2.36)
This is just a rst order di¤erence equation with t.
Recall that by the result of Lemma 2 t = (1   )z(qt)=M: From (2.26), we have
q0t+1(
M
1 ) = t+1=z
0(qt+1). Combine these results with (2.36), we obtain
z(qNt ) = z(q
N
t+1)[
1
k
u0(qNt+1)
z0(qNt+1)
+ 1  1
k
]: (2.37)
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Therefore the equilibrium can be summarized by the solution to this di¤erence equation
about qt.
Denition 6. Dene a steady state as an equilibrium in which qt is constant.
Then, the steady state consumption of nonbankers in the decentralized market must
satisfy
u0(qN)
z0(qN)
= 1 +
(1  )  k

: (2.38)
For bankers, the steady state consumption in the day market is q.
2.5 WELFARE ANALYSIS
The remaining of the paper focus on steady state equilibrium. The following propositions
summarize the welfare analysis in this economy.
Proposition 7. The optimal monetary policy is the Friedman rule.
Equation (2.38) implies that marginal utility is higher than the marginal cost for non-
banker buyers. This means that the trading quantity with nonbanker buyers is lower than
the e¢ cient level. From the right hand side of (2.38), we can see that the ine¢ ciency is
caused by the discount rate. This implies that the Friedman rule is still optimal monetary
policy if feasible in this economy.
Proposition 8. The introduction of private money improves the total welfare of the economy.
Proof. First of all, notice that in the steady state, nonbankersconsumption will not change
by the introduction of private money. In the day market his consumption is determined
by equation (2.38), just the same with the case without private money. And in the night
market, all agentsnight time consumption is X. Compared with the economy without
private money, the only welfare change introduced by private money is in the case when
a banker buyer meets a right seller. So we only need to consider this case. Lets rst
consider how the banker buyers welfare will change. For the banker buyer, he will enjoy
more consumption in the day market than in an economy without private money. His utility
increase from more daytime consumption is u(q)   u(bq). Meanwhile, the banker buyer
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have to work more in the night market to cover the more notes he issued during the day.
The buyer pays M when there is only outside money. Now the bank buyer pays m: His
utility loss from more payment is t(m
   M). Thus, the net gain for the banker buyer
is u(q)   u(bq)   t(m  M). Now consider how the sellers welfare will change. In the
case without private money, the seller produces bq in the day market and gets M amount of
money. Now if he meets a right banker buyer, he would produce q and get m amount of
money. His net gain thus is t(m
  M)  [c(q)  c(bq)]. Combine the welfare change of the
banker buyer and the seller, the total welfare change caused by the introduction of private
money is [u(q) u(bq)]  [c(q)  c(bq)]. Its easy to show that this welfare change is positive.
Since q is the only q to maximize the item u(q)  c(q); and since we know that bq is di¤erent
from q, the item [u(q)   c(q)]   [u(bq)   c(bq)] is strictly positive. Therefore, the welfare
change introduced by private money is strictly positive.
Proposition 9. Both bankers and nonbankers share the welfare gain introduced by private
money. The welfare gain is divided between the banker buyer and the seller according to their
bargaining power.
Proof. It is easy to see that the banker buyer will enjoy the welfare gain introduced by
private money because he now has one more degree of freedom by issuing his own notes. He
will not do so if his welfare decreases by doing so. For nonbankers, his welfare will also be
improved by the introduction of private money. Consider a nonbanker seller meets a right
banker buyer. If he accepts the deal, his welfare change will be t(m
  M)  [c(q)  c(bq)].
From equation (2.22) and (2.23), we have
t(m
  M) = [c(q) + (1  )u(q)]  c(bq)u0(bq) + (1  )u(bq)c0(bq)
u0(bq) + (1  )c0(bq) : (2.39)
Notice that if  = 1, the above item is simply [c(q)  c(bq)], which means the sellers welfare
gain is zero. In this case, the buyer, which is a banker, has the maximum bargaining
power and will enjoy all the welfare gain introduced by private money. If  = 0, which
means the seller has the maximum bargaining power, then the right hand side of equation
(2.39) can be simplied as u(q)   u(bq):In this case, the welfare change for the seller is
[u(q)   c(q)]   [u(bq)   c(bq)], which is the total welfare gain. If 0 <  < 1, then the
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seller has some bargaining power and will enjoy a positive welfare gain introduced by private
money.
It is interesting to realize that the nonbankers are also able to enjoy the welfare im-
provement in this economy with private money. In fact, this result is intuitive. Since the
equilibrium of the economy is determined by the bargain between the buyer and seller, unless
the seller has no bargaining power, the nonbanker, as a seller, can always get a bite on the
welfare gain introduced by private money. Since all the nonbankers in this economy have
the strictly positive chance to meet a banker buyer who will consume his production, the
welfare of a nonbanker is thus strictly improved by introducing private money.
2.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we introduce divisible private money into the LW model. The note redemption
of notes adds another dimension of randomness into the model, which makes it harder to
solve analytically. Assuming no cost to issue note, no interest return on reserves and 100%
reserve requirement, we obtain the analytical solution of the model. The distribution of
note redemption does not a¤ect bankersvalue function in his optimization problem. The
distribution of excess reserves among bankers degenerates, as well as the distribution of
money holdings among nonbankers. The degeneration of the distributions of money holdings
and excess reserves in this paper resembles the basic result in LW, except that their model
has no private money and thus less complicated than the environment in this paper.
The central contribution of the paper is to study the welfare consequences of private
money within the framework of the random matching model. Given that the Friedman rule
is not achievable, we nd that the introduction of private money improves the welfare in
the economy. Both bankers and nonbankers enjoy the welfare unless their bargaining power
is zero. Bankers enjoy more consumption as buyers in the day market. Nonbankers enjoy
more monetary income as the seller and thus less work in the night market. The divide of
the welfare gain between banker buyers and sellers is determined by their bargaining power.
We also nd that the role of private money can be understood as a particular mechanism
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of credit. Essentially, bankers in this model issue banknotes as if they are given a zero cost
short term credit, which is similar to the credit card with zero APR within the billing cycle.
Although only bankers are access to this type of credit, the whole society enjoy the welfare
improvement introduced by this credit.
We set the fraction of bankers as exogenously given in the paper. One expansion for
future work could be endogenizing the fraction of the population who can enjoy the credit.
Another interesting expansion could be the reserve management of present banks. In our
model bankers issue notes rather than attracts deposits. The modern banks do not issue
money, but accept deposits. How monetary policies on ination or reserve ratios a¤ect
bankers reserve management and the consequent allocation in the economy? This is a
natural question to be answered when we understand the case of private banking notes.
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3.0 DO INSTITUTIONS MATTER? ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF
INSTITUTIONS ON ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN CHINA
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Chinas real GDP per capita has been growing with an average of 7.4% for almost thirty
years.1 While some suspect that Chinas GDP numbers has been exaggerated, the impressive
economic growth of China is a widely-recognized statistical fact (Perkins & Rawski, Chapter
20). Chinas economic success is generally owed to the reform and opening policy since 1978,
which has been transforming the economy toward market system step by step. However, the
consequence of the reform is not evenly distributed across the country. A country of the
size close to Europe with one fth of world population, China contains more than 300 cities
with substantial variations in both production and institutions existing among them. For
example, in 2003 the GDP per capita in Shenzhen, one of fastest growing cities in China,
was 54,545 yuan, while in Chongqing, a city located in southwest mountain area of China,
that number was 8,077 yuan. Di¤erent measurements show large variation of institutions
among regions. For example, in the Marketization Index constructed by Fan et al (2003),
Guangdong was valued as 8.41 in 2000 while Xinjiang valued only 3.15. A research of World
Bank estimates that 80 percent of productivity gap between cities within could be explained
by the investment climate (World Bank Investment Climate Research Program). In this
paper we try to estimate the e¤ects of institutions on Chinas economy with cross-city data.
The topic of this paper relates to a general issue regarding on economic development:
1According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, Chinas GDP per capita increased from 381
yuan in 1978 to 14,040 yuan in 2005. The Consumer Price Index increase from 100 to 464 during the same
period (National Bureau of Statistics of China).
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how to understand the large spatial di¤erence in economic performance? Economists have
o¤ered variant explanations. Many researchers believe that economic performance is rooted
in millions of individual economic decisions. When making the economic decisions about
investment, education or R&D (research and development) investment, people and rms re-
spond to incentives, which are guided by the institutions of a society. Therefore, some believe
that institutions are the most important determinant for economic development (North and
Thomas, 1973; North, 1981 and 1990, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2004). In contrast,
some scholars argue that geography shapes human history and plays a fundamental role in
economic growth (Diamond 1997, Sachs and Warner 1995, 1997). Others argue that hu-
man capital and government policies are the most important determinants of development
(Glaeser et al., 2004). China provides a nice setting to compare the e¤ects of institutions,
geography and policies. Besides the regional variations of production and institutions, China
exhibits large di¤erences in geography and government policies across localities. Compared
with the cross-country study, one merit of China case is that as an economy with uniform
currency, legal system, trade regime and historic-cultrual background, we could compare the
e¤ects of institutions, geography and policies with less noise from other possible inuential
factors.
One di¢ culty in estimating the e¤ects of institutions is that institutions are endoge-
nous. Richer economies are able to a¤ord better education, more lawyers and prosecutors,
more educated government o¢ cials, better public media and so on, thus, better institutions.
Moreover, there could be other factors, such as geography, that a¤ect both institutions and
economic performance. Because of the endogeneity of institutions, the OLS estimate of the
e¤ect of institutions on economic performance is biased, making it impossible to determine
the causal relationship between institutions and economic performance. In order to obtain
the unbiased estimate, we need to nd an instrumental variable for institutions.
Econometrically, to estimate the e¤ects of institutions on economic performance requires
that we nd instruments for institutions. Mauro (1995) used ethnolinguistic fractionalization
to instrument corruption and bureaucratic e¢ ciency. Hall and Jones (1999) used the dis-
tances to the equator across countries as the instrument for social infrastructure. Acemoglu
et al (2001) employed European settler mortality rates to instrument institutions. However,
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there are some concerns regarding the validity of these instruments. Some authors argued
that the ethnolinguistic fractionalization is inuenced by economic performance (see Ace-
moglu et al., 2001). Distances from the equator can a¤ect the economy through climate and
geography rather than institutions (Bloom and Sachs 1998; Gallup et al., 1998). Glaeser
et al. (2004) argued that historic European settler mortality was correlated with current
disease environment and human capital which could inuence current economic performance
directly rather than through institutions.
We propose to adopt the enrollment in Protestant missionary lower primary schools in
the early 20th century as an instrumental variable for Chinas present institutions. Our main
logic can be summarized into three arguments:
1. Chinas present reform can be viewed as a part of longer historical movement of
"modernization," which can be traced back at least one and a half centuries. The main
feature of this movement is learning from the West and transforming China from pre-modern
economy to modern economy.
2. Those areas that experienced deeper historical inuence by the West have developed
institutions more favorable to the market economy and the protection of property rights.
3. The enrollment in Protestant missionary lower primary schools in 1919 reects the
inuence by the West in early 20th century China.
The sketch of our logic is: the inuence of the West ) institutions ) economic perfor-
mance. With the instrument, we perform the Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation
and nd that institutions are signicant in explaining Chinas variation in economic per-
formance across cities in our sample. The results survive various robustness tests. Our
results show that institutions dominate geography and policy in explaining economic varia-
tion among Chinas cities.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the historical background
of Chinas institutional change. Section 3 discusses our strategy to instrument Chinas
institutions. Section 4 describes the measurements we adopt in this paper and our data set.
In section 5 we estimate the e¤ect of institutions on economic performance and check the
robustness. Section 6 compares the e¤ect of institutions with those of geography and policy.
Finally, section 7 serves as conclusion.
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3.2 INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN CHINA: A BRIEF REVIEW OF
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Although Chinas current reform started in 1978, many historians see this reform as the
most recent dimension of a much longer and greater transitional process (Ray Huang, 1988;
Degang Tang, 1998). This process, which dates back to 1553 when Portuguese was allowed
to anchor and trade at Macau by China, accelerated in particular after China encountered
a series of military defeats by the western countries during the second half of 19th century.
Following the imposition of a free trade regime upon China at several port cities, Chinese
local markets had become integrated with the international economy and markets at least by
1890s (Brandt, 1985). Many Chinese then realized that China had to learn from the western
culture to modernize its social system and introduced modern industries into China. The
process su¤ered many setbacks. However, after the settlement of the turmoil in 1900 that
caused the occupation of Beijing by eight western countries, outside observers viewed China
as having entered a new era. The following remark is not from a recent New York Times
issue on current China, but a description by a Christian observer writing in 1919:
The two decades have been distinctly revolutionary in tendency: this not in the old
sense alone which resulted in the displacement of individuals, but deeper, in that during
this period ancient principles and institutions have been moved aside for something new.
... More signicant than any other change has been that in the temper of the people. After
all, the changes already registered are precursors of wider ones. China will not only reect
the changes going on all over the world but will materially help to change the world. Four
hundred million people cannot wake up and leave the rest of the world untouched. ( Frank
Rawlinson, Change and progress in the Christian movement in China during the last two
decades 1900-1920, The Christian Occupation of China, 1922)
In 1911 the last dynasty in Chinas history, Qing Dynasty, was overturned by the Xinhai
Revolution and succeeded by the Republic of China. After the revolution and the World
War I, China experienced a rapid industrial spurt. The following quote delivers a rough but
impressive picture of the economy in early years of the Republic of China.
The coming of modern industry to China has been described as "a terric invasion."
This modern revolution is taking place so quietly that few people are aware that anything
untoward is happening. To estimate the growth in terms of gures is not easy, since no
authentic and complete list of factories has as yet been published. In the China Year Book
of 1921 a list of "the more important trades" is given, showing that almost every type of
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industry is to be found in China, e.g. Arsenals, Canneries, Cement Work, Confectionery,
Cotton, Chemicals, Breweries, Dockyards, Shipbuilding, Engineering, Flour Mills, Furni-
ture, Glass, ...This list does not include certain industries with which the name of China
is particularly associated, e.g. Carpets, Rugs, Porcelain, etc. The above are listed under
some 50 centers scattered over China. The secretary of the Chinese Maritime Customs says,
"There are foreign-type articles of domestic consumption that are not now manufactured
in China by factories on modern lines, the majority without foreign assistance." For proof
of this mushroom-like growth, return visits to some of our factory districts after an interval
of a few months will su¢ ce, or reading the notes under "Industry in China" which appear
in the Far Eastern Review or in the Weekly Review of the Far East from time to time (
The Christian Occupation of China, 1922).
It seems that China was then experiencing an early phase of what Kuznets terms modern
economic growth. Railroads were expanded and factories erected. Between 1913 and 1920
Chinese managers established 1,061 modern factories with capital investment totaling around
170 million Chinese dollars2 and employing over a quarter million workers (Myers, 1980, pp.
126). The development continued to the World War II. According John K. Changs index
of industrial production between 1911 and 1949, from 1911 until 1936, both the gross and
net value production show a rapid annual growth rate of around 9.4 percent (Chang, 1969).
This growth rate is higher than that of the United Kingdom (1820-1870, 3.0 percent), the
United States (1860-1914, 5.9 percent), and Japan (1906-1935, 6.4 percent) (Myers, 1980,
pp.135-136).
However, the transition process was interrupted by the battle against Japanese invaders
from 1937 to 1945 and the subsequent civil war between the Kuomintang government and
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) between 1946 and 1949. When the war ended in 1949,
the Republic of China moved to Taiwan while on the mainland it was replaced by Peoples
Republic of China. China kept learning from the West, however, this time from Karl Marx.
The CCP copied the economic model of Soviet Union and transformed Chinese economy by
embracing central planning. The CCP government promoted manufacturing through high
compulsory savings and distorted low prices of inputs. China built a rather complete sector
of heavy industries, such as oil, steel, ship and even airplane. However, it is believed that
there existed a big gap between Chinas economic performance and its potential during the
plan economy era (Brandt and Rawski, 2007).
2One Chinese dollar equals to US$0.26 in 1933 (Myers, 1980, pp. 251).
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In 1978, when DENG Xiaoping became the leader of the party, China began a series of
reforms that gradually moved the planned economy toward a market-oriented system. In
1978 millions of farm households regained certain freedom to manege agricultural production.
Thousands of Chinese students were sent to universities in western countries. State-owned
enterprises began to recruit managers publicly in 1983 and began to issue stocks in 1987. In
1990 the public stock exchange was established. At the same time, private-owned enterprises
and village-owned enterprises (TVEs or Xiangzhen Qiye) have been encouraged and then
prospered. Between 1978 and 2005, Chinas trade volume has increased 68-fold in terms of
US dollars. The FDI into China increased from 2.65 billion US dollars in 1984 to 189.06
billion US dollars in 2005 (National Bureau of Statistics of China). In 2001 China was
accepted as a member of WTO.
In short, Chinas current reform can be viewed as a part of a long and winding road of
"modernization" characterized by "learning from theWest." Based on this historical view, we
believe that the inuence by the West during early decades of 20th century had a signicant
inuence on Chinas current economic performance.
3.3 THE INSTRUMENT FOR CHINAS INSTITUTIONS
Before we estimate the e¤ects of institutions, we need to be aware of how to dene insti-
tutions. The term "institutions" is a concept that can include many things from general
law to cultural conventions. However, following North and Thomas (1973) and North (1981,
1990), our hypothesis is that the protection for property rights is the key to explain the
economic performance. Thus, we consider the core of institutions as a set of social rules
that protect property rights. And also following North (1981), it is the real rules embodied
in the enforcement rather than the words written on paper that really count. One research
report by World Bank supports this argument. "It is not just formal policies that matter.
The implementation of policies is what is experienced with 95 percent of rms reporting
a gap between what is on the books and how regulations are interpreted in practice. This
gap provides a key opening to corruption and by raising uncertainty lowers the probabil-
ity of investment by up to a third" (World Bank Investment Climate Research Program).
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Therefore, we focus on the implmentation of the institution of property rights protection.
Colorful as they are, Chinas ongoing changes can be viewed as a transition from a
planned economy to a market economy, during which the property rights get more and more
respect and protection. Although di¤erent localities of China share a uniform political and
legal system on paper, actual institutions the enforcement of the market system have large
variation across regions. For example, the list of Chinas 100 most competitive private rms
in 2005 shows that the vast majority are based in just 3 of 32 provincial administrative regions
on Chinas mainland, 37 rms on the list are from Zhejiang province, 16 from Guangdong,
and 10 from Jiangsu (Liu, Zhao and Liu, 2007).
How China, a country with strong central government and a uniform constitution and
legal system, presents so large regional variation in institutions? First, although the reform
and opening policy is adopted by central government, many specic reforms were initiated
by local governments. Beneath the uniform political and legal system, the extent to which
people engage with the market is largely determined by their condence in the protection of
property rights by the local administrative practice, which is highly inuenced by the local
conventions and understandings of institutions. These local conventions are the result of his-
torical evolution of the local community. We believe that current conventions are related to
the historical inuence from the western in the local community in early 20th century. Since
the modern market system and the protection of property rights are institutional establish-
ments originating from the western countries, regions with deeper histories of inuence from
the West should experience greater penetration of market institutions.
We use the enrollment in Protestant missionary lower primary schools to capture the
extent of the inuence by the West. The earliest Christian mission in China may be traced
back to 1582 when Matteo Ricci came to China. However, organized missionary activities
began after 1841, just paralleling the process of Chinas active learning from the western
countries. During the Boxer turmoil in 1900 the Christian Church was heavily destroyed in
some areas. But the Church recovered rapidly after the turmoil. During the early years of
the Republic of China, Christian missions in China had developed rapidly. Almost every
province had Christian missionary centers and almost every mission station had a lower
primary school. From the Chinese viewpoint, the Christians represented western culture.
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Hence, the extent of local Christian inuence can serve as a measure of how much the area
was inuenced by the West.
Since current institutions are related to the historical inuence of the West, the early
Christian inuence can serve as an instrument for todays institution of property rights
protection. The data of our instrument is described in the next section. In panel A of table
2, we see that institutions are signicant when regressed to log GDP per capita in 2003.
However, due to the endogeneity of institutions, this result should be read as a relationship
of correlation rather than causality. In panel B of table 2, we see that our instrument is
signicant as an explanatory variable for present institutions.
The exclusion condition of the instrument assumes that the instrument a¤ects current
economic performance only through institutions. To investigate whether the condition holds,
we consider two possible violations of the exclusion condition. One concern is: What if the
historical enrollment of the Protestant missionary lower primary schools could a¤ect current
distribution of Christian religion in China and current Christian religion in turn a¤ects
economic performance directly rather than through institutions? Missionary schools taught
not only religious subjects but also curricula about modern knowledge. Long before 1927,
the number of required hours of Bible study in missionary primary schools had been reduced
(Idabelle Lewis Main, 1934, pp. 270). The new curricula focused more on citizenship training
and Chinese language (Howson Lee, 1934). Kiang-wen Han (1934, pp. 313) concluded that
"on the whole, religion does not hold an important place in the life and thinking of the
students in China." Moreover, after 1949 all religions in China declined due to the o¢ cial
atheist ideology and the suppression of religions during the Cultural Revolution between
1966 and 1976. The recent revival of religion including Christian missionaries in China since
1978 is di¢ cult to measure. Besides the authorized missionary activities, there are variant
forms of unauthorized missions, including overseas missionaries and underground churches.
In general, we believe the historical Christian distribution has little impact on Chinas current
Christian distribution.
More importantly, as Robert J. Barro and Rachel M. McCleary (2003, 2005) argued, it
is general belief in God, heaven, hell and afterlife, hell in particular, rather than organized
religious activities, that positively a¤ect economic performance. And particularly, Barro and
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McCleary (2003) found in cross-country data that after controlling for the beliefs in heaven
or hell, the Protestant share of religious population actually detracts from economic growth.
Chinese people have a long history of belief in heaven, hell and afterlife that dates back to the
Han Dynasty (206 B.C. - 220 A.D.) or earlier (Yu, 1964, 1987). The introduction of Buddhism
into China since late Han Dynasty and its subsequent popularity spread the belief in hell and
the afterlife across China. Compared with the Buddhists or the mass of believers in hell and
afterlife, Christians are small minority in China. We therefore believe that the enrollment in
Protestant missionary primary schools in 1919 has very little inuence on current Chinese
beliefs about heaven or hell and could not a¤ect current economic performance directly.
We perform an intuitive test on whether our instrument a¤ects current log GDP per
capita directly. If the historical enrollment in Protestant missionary lower primary schools
(our instrument) a¤ects current log GDP per capita only through institutions, then our
instrument should be signicant when explaining log GDP alone but NOT signicant when
explaining log GDP along with institutions. We see this exact outcome in panel A of table
2. When we regress log GDP per capita in 2003 on our instrument (historical enrollment
of missionary lower primary schools) alone, the coe¢ cient of our instrument is 0.18 and
signicant at 5% level. However, when we regress log GDP per capita in 2003 on both
average protection of property rights and historical enrollment of missionary lower primary
schools, the coe¢ cient of our instrument is not signicant while institutions remain signicant
at 5% level.
The other concern about the violation of exclusion condition is that the instrument is
correlated with other unobserved determinants of economic performance. We test three
possible underlying factors. First, if Christian missions were more prevalent in coastal areas
than inland, then our instrument could be correlated with distance to the coast, which could
possibly a¤ect GDP per capita across regions through several other channels, such as the
adoption of FDI and access to international trade. Thus our instrument could a¤ect economic
performance through distance to coast rather than institutions. However, the distribution of
1919 Christian missionaries does not correlate with distance to coast. The Treaty of Tientsin
between China and France in 1860 allowed Christian missions to establish their missionary
stations far from the coast. The Most Favored Nation Clause enabled all western countries to
34
locate missions in Chinas hinterland. As Albert Feuerwerker (1983, pp. 165-167) described,
"Protected by general and specic extraterritorial provisions of treaties, they reached into
nearly every corner of the country. As of 1899 all but 106 out of 1704 counties or hsien in
China proper and Manchuria reported some Protestant missionary activity."
We regress our instrument on distance to the coast and report the result in panel C of
table 2. We nd that there is no signicant correlation between the two. In panel B of table
2, we add distance to coast as an additional control in our regression of institutions, and
nd that our instrument is still signicant in explaining the institutions when distance to
the coast is controlled.
The second possible underlying factor is that the historical distribution of Protestant
primary school pupils may a¤ect the current economy through the channel of human capital.
If higher enrollment means better education conditions and higher human capital in the
1920s, then our instrument could inuence current economic performance through historical
human capital rather than institutions. However, we believe this cannot be the case for the
following reasons. Missionary lower primary school pupils were only around 4% as many as
those in government primary schools in the 1920s (Albert Feuerwerker, 1983). We check this
by regressing our instrument on the total primary school enrollment, which we employ to
capture human capital in the 1920s. The result is reported in panel C of table 2. There is
no signicant correlation between the two variables.
3.4 MEASUREMENTS AND DATA
Chinas subnational governments can be categorized into four administrative levels: province,
city, county and town. There are only 34 observations3 at the provincial level. Particularly,
in early 1900s China had only 18 provinces, some of which have been divided and merged
into others. Using city-level data we can obtain more observations. Our sample consists of
47 cities listed in table A2. The sample size is restricted by the data of institutions. One
complicated issue is that city boundaries have changed a lot during the last 100 years. The
3Totally, China has 34 provincial level sub-national governments, including 23 provinces, 5 autonomous
regions, 4 province-level cities and 2 special administrative areas (Hong Kong and Macau).
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data of historical enrollment of Protestant missionary primary schools are at county level.
Since the boundaries of counties are rather stable during the whole 20th century, we can
match the county-level data of Christian mission with the city-level data of institutions.
As mentioned above, we focus on the institution of property right protection in this
paper. It is always di¢ cult to measure institutions. There are two basic methods to measure
institutions. One is subjective measurement, in which peoples opinions about institutions
are evaluated through survey and aggregated into a quantitative index. The alternative
is objective measurement based on statistical facts about the results of institutions. For
example, the waiting time for government approval for starting a business is observed and
used as a measurement for institutions. In this paper we use subjective measurement. The
data is from a cross-city survey conducted by Pengfei Ni et al in 2002 and 2003 (Ni et
al, 2004, 2005). The survey covered 47 cities of prefectural or higher level. For each city,
they sent out 2000 questionnaires to scholars, entrepreneurs and randomly sampled citizens,
asking them to grade the citys performance in a wide range of aspects. For each listed item,
the respondent selected from ve options ranging from highest (favorable) to the lowest
(unfavorable). The highest option was set by Ni as 1.5 while the lowest -1.5. For each
aspect, Ni et al calculated the mean score and then constructed an index ranging from 0 to
1 across 47 cities.
We focus on the index of property rights protection developed by Ni et al. This includes
three sub-indices: the extent to which the government resorts to informal tax levies, pro-
tection of intellectual property rights, and protection of contract enforcement by the legal
system. We take the average of their index of property rights protection for year 2002 and
2003 as our main measurement of institutions. The city with the best institutions is Xia-
men, whose average index of property rights protection is 0.896. The lowest in the sample
is from Wuhan, which is 0.5035. We nd that among the top 10 cities with highest average
index, 7 are from Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Guangdong. This is consistent with the index for
the most competitive private enterprises of China in 2005 constructed by Liu et al (2007).
Ni also constructed the index of comprehensive institutions and the sub-index of informal
government collection and fees. We use these two indices as complementary measurements
for institutions to check the robustness of our results.
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The data of historical enrollment of Protestant missionary lower primary schools is from
a survey conducted by the Continuation Committee in 1920. The results of the survey was
beautifully edited into a book titled "The Christian Occupation of China". The survey had
all the county-level data about the enrollment of Protestant missionary lower and higher
primary schools in 1919. We choose only lower primary school as our main measurement of
the instrumental variable because the data of higher primary school are rather incomplete.
For example, there were only 306 reported higher primary schools out of the 693 Protestant
residential centers (Albert Feuerwerker, 1982). Since the survey includes the population for
each county as well, we can calculate the enrollment of missionary lower primary schools per
100,000 persons, which is our instrumental variable for institutions.
Finally, to measure the economic performance across regions, we use log GDP per capita
of all cites in 2003, following Hall and Jones (1999). The data is obtained from Urban
Statistical Yearbook of China 2004, in terms of the Chinese currency, or yuan. In table A1
we describe all other variables used in this paper and list the data sources.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of our main data. The average of log GDP per
capita for all 47 cities in 2003 is 10.048 and the standard deviation in the sample is 0.4842.
The maximum observation is 11.004 while the minimum is 8.996, which means that the GDP
per capita of the richest city in our sample was almost 7.5 times of the poorest city in 2003.
The sample mean of average protection of property rights is 0.6509 and the standard devia-
tion is 0.0979. The average of the enrollment in missionary lower primary schools is 72.258
per 100,000 population and the standard deviation is 84.656. The maximum observation is
420.223 per 100,000 population and the minimum is only 1.3828 per 100,000 population.
3.5 ESTIMATES
3.5.1 The Model
Although institutions are signicant in the OLS regression reported in panel A of table
2, it should be read as no more than correlation. We cannot infer a causal relationship
between institutions and economic performance from OLS estimates. Moreover, due to the
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endogeneity of institutions, the OLS estimate is biased. Hence, we use the two-stage least
squares (2SLS) method to estimate the e¤ect of institutions on economic performance. The
basic model is
yi = a+  bPi + Xi + i (3.1)
Pi = b+ Ei + Xi + i (3.2)
where yi, Pi and Ei respectively denote log GDP per capita in 2003, average protection of
property rights in 2002-2003 and historical enrollment of missionary lower primary schools
for city i. bPi is the predicted value from equation (3.2). We use Xi to denote the covariants
such as distance to the coast, rainfall, temperature, approximate historical human capital,
government policy and so on. In the rst stage we regress the observed measure of current
institutional performance Pi on our instrumental variable Ei and the covariants Xi. The
i is the error term: In the second stage we regress current GDP per capita yi on the
predicted institutions bPi derived from the rst stage, with i as the error term. Covariants
Xi appear in both regressions. The parameter of interest is the coe¢ cient  in (3.1), the e¤ect
of institutions on economic performance. Our identication strategy is that the historical
enrollment distribution of missionary lower primary schools is not correlated with the error
term i in the second stage.
3.5.2 Main Results
Table 3 lists our main ndings regarding the e¤ect of institutions on economic outcomes.
Panel A lists the estimation results from the second stage regression with log GDP per
capita in 2003 as dependent variable. Panel B lists results from the rst stage regression
with average protection of property rights as the dependent variable. Table 3 is our main
specication with the enrollment in Protestant missionary lower primary schools as the
instrument for institutions. The 2SLS estimate of institutions is 4.23, which is signicant at
the 5% level for a two-sided t-statistic.
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Compared to the OLS estimate in panel A of table 2, there are two points worthy of
notice. First, the coe¢ cient of institutions is signicant in both regressions. The coe¢ cient
in the 2SLS regression is 4.23, which implies that the citys GDP per capita will increase by
4.23% if its average index of property rights protection increases by 0.01. For example, if
Tianjin could improve its property rights to Beijings level, from 0.64 to 0.68, then its GDP
per capita could increase by about 17%. Second, the value of the coe¢ cient in the 2SLS
is much larger than in the OLS regression. From this perspective our result is similar to
Acemoglu et al. (2001), in which their 2SLS result is twice that in OLS. This shows that
the OLS estimate of the e¤ect of institutions is downward biased, which is the same as the
ndings of Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu et al (2001).
We also report the value of the Anderson canonical correlation likelihood ratio test (Alas-
tair Hall, et al., 1996). The null hypothesis of the test is that the rst stage regression is
underidentied, i.e., that the instrument is not relevant. Under the null hypothesis, the test
converges to a Chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom. The Anderson canonical
correlation LR test reported in column (1) is 7.491. The small p-value 0.006 means we can
signicantly reject the null hypothesis.
3.6 ROBUSTNESS
3.6.1 Possible Violations of the Exclusion Condition
We have discussed in section 3 the concerns about validity of the exclusion condition for our
instrument with several intuitive OLS regressions. As a robustness test, we insert additional
right-hand variables into 2SLS as additional controls to test the validity of our instrumental
variable. If our exclusion assumption holds, the coe¢ cient of institutions in the second
stage regression should not change remarkably when additional controls are added to the
regression. The results are reported in table 4. In column (1) we add distance to the coast as
an additional control that enters both stages. In the rst stage, both historical enrollment of
missionary lower primary schools per 1000 persons and distance to the coast are signicant.
In the second stage, the coe¢ cient of institutions is 3.779 and is still signicant, but the
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coe¢ cient of distance to the coast is not signicant. This shows that distance to the coast
is not signicant in explaining the log GDP per capita when institutions are considered.
Column (2) responds to the concern that our instrument might be correlated to the
historical geographic distribution of human capital, which a¤ects current economic perfor-
mance. It is di¢ cult to nd the data of the historical human capital. We approximate it
with the total primary school enrollment per 1000 population, which includes the histori-
cal enrollment of lower and higher primary schools of both missionary and government per
1,000 persons in 1919. In the rst stage, we nd that only the enrollment of missionary
lower primary schools helps to explain the variation of institutions across regions. The total
enrollment is not signicant. In the second stage, the coe¢ cient of institutions is 4.304 and
signicant at the 5% level, while the control variable is not signicant. So the historical
human capital does not a¤ect current economic performance.
In column (3) we examine the possible correlation between the historical geographic
distribution of enrollment in Protestant missionary lower primary schools and the initial
conditions of di¤erent cities before the reform. We use the earliest available cross-city data
of national income4 we can nd to measure the initial condition, and that is for 1985.5 The
rst stage regression shows that both our instrument and initial conditions before the reform
are signicant. In the second stage regression, the coe¢ cient of institutions is 4.115 and is
still signicant at 5% level while the initial condition is not signicant. In column (4) we
consider both distance to the coast and initial conditions together as the control variables.
The 2SLS shows that neither of the two controls is signicant while institutions are still
signicant. Overall, our estimates of institutions are rather stable in all specications, which
supports our arguments about exclusion restrictions that our instrument is valid.
3.6.2 Di¤erent Measurements of Institutions
We also test whether our result is robust to the measurement of institutions. One di¢ culty
of estimating the impact of institutions lies in how to measure the institutions, more specif-
4We approximate the "national income" as the sum of gross agricutural output values and value added
in industry for each city. The "national income per capita" is the "national income" divided by each citys
population in 1985.
5The urban economic reform in China had not been launched in large scale until 1985.
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ically for our purpose, how to measure the institution of protecting property rights. The
measurement of the institution is always controversial. Whatever measure we adopt, there
will always be some unsatisfactory aspects.
As we explained in previous section, our main specication uses the average of the index of
property rights protection in the two surveys by Ni et al (2004, 2005) to measure institutions.
Ni et al (2004, 2005) also provides some other measures, such as the comprehensive index
of institutions and the index for government collection of informal fees, which represents an
abrogation of property rights. The comprehensive index of institutions is the general index
based on a series sub-indices to measure various aspects of each citys legal, government and
enterprise systems. The index showing the prevalence of informal fees measures the extent to
which the government imposes extra-legal charges on private business. In table 5 we report
the result when those di¤erent variables are used to measure institutions. Panel A reports
the e¤ects of institutions on log GDP when the measurements listed on the left are used.
Institutions are signicant with all three di¤erent measurements. Panel B reports the result
of rst stage when institutions are the dependent measured by the variables listed on the
left. In all cases, our instrument is signicant in explaining institutions.
3.7 INSTITUTIONS, GEOGRAPHY AND POLICY
3.7.1 Institutions versus Geography
As we mentioned in the introduction, geography may play a role in background that inu-
ences economic development. Table 6 reports the results of adding geographic controls. One
of most popular geographic variables used in the literature is latitude. In column (1), latitude
is added into the regression. The inclusion of latitude does not change the result very much.
The coe¢ cient of institutions remains signicant and takes on a value of 3.559. Latitude is
not signicant in the second stage regression and is not helpful to interpret the variation of
institutions in the rst stage regression. Other geographic variables include average temper-
ature and rainfall. Column (2) adds average temperature as the additional control. In the
second stage, we nd that coe¢ cients of institutions and average temperature are 3.400 and
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0.027 respectively and both estimators are signicant. However, the average temperature is
not signicant in the rst stage regression, i.e., does not help us to interpret the variation of
institutions across regions. In column (3), rainfall is added to the regression. The coe¢ cient
of institutions is signicant and takes on a value of 3.949. Rainfall is not signicant in either
stage.
Besides institutions, another channel that may have an e¤ect on todays economy is
through the geographically related cultural nature of people. Therefore we should test our
argument by controlling the cultural nature across localities. Among the complicated cultural
di¤erences across localities in China, the most prominent is the cultural di¤erence between
the North and South divided by the Yangzi River, which is mentioned by Jared Diamond
(1997). So in column (4) we use north-south dummy as another additional control variable.
If the city is located south of the Yangzi River, we set the dummy as 1 and otherwise 0. The
coe¢ cient of institutions is 3.950 and is signicant at 5% level. The south-north dummy is
not signicant in either stage and does not help us to interpret the variation of institutions
across localities. In column (5), we add all these geographically related variables to the
regression. The coe¢ cient of institutions is signicant and takes a value of 3.479. All others
are not signicant.
Overall, adding geographically related variables cannot change the estimate of institu-
tions very much. The estimates of institutions instrumented by historical distribution of
missionary lower primary schools are rather stable and always signicant, as shown in table
6.
3.7.2 Institutions versus Policies
Some economists argue that government policy is more important than institutions to pro-
mote economic growth (Edward Glaeser, et al., 2004). To test this argument in the case
of China, we add into the main specication of 2SLS regression some policy variables as
control variables. One policy variable we use is the dummy variable of central government
policy. For a long time, China was divided into three regions in terms of economic policy:
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eastern, central and western, each assigned a specic task.6 Although the income per capita
varies greatly across the country, it exhibits convergence within each of the three regions.
Some believe this is due to the di¤erent developing strategies adopted by the government
for di¤erent regions (Lin, 2004). For example, the eastern region enjoys a more favorable
policy to develop the light industries, while the central and western region for a long time
focused on agriculture and heavy industries. We use two dummies to capture a citys policy
zone: east and west. If a city falls into the east zone, its east dummy is set as 1 and its west
dummy is set as 0. If a city falls into the west zone, its east dummy is 0 and west 1. If a city
falls into middle zone, then both dummies are set equal to 0. Results are reported in column
(1) of table 7. None of the east and west dummies is signicant in the second stage, while
average protection of property rights is still signicant and the coe¢ cient is 3.866. In the
rst stage, our instrument is still signicant to interpret the variation of institutions across
regions and the coe¢ cient is relatively stable. The west dummy is not signicant in the
rst stage. The east dummy is signicant and the value is 0.107 in the rst stage. It seems
to us that the central government development policy is not the main explanation for the
di¤erence in GDP across the cities in our sample.
In column (2) of table 7, we add a dummy for coastal open cities as an additional
control. These coastal open cities beneted from more favorable policies on economic reform
and development. When the dummy for coastal open cities is included, the coe¢ cient of
institutions is 4.405 and signicant at 5% level in the second stage regression. The coe¢ cient
of the dummy for coastal open cities is not signicant in either stage.
Chinas cities have di¤erent administrative ranks. The top rank is provincial-level cities
(zhixiashi), including Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing. The second rank is deputy-
provincial level (fushengji) cities. The third rank is prefectural-level cities (dijishi) and
includes all outside the top 2 classes. The fourth rank cities are below the prefectual level, i.e.
county-level cities (xian). The 47 cities in our sample are all of the top three administrative
ranks. Higher administrative rank usually means greater political power in competing for
6In this paper, the eastern region includes Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Macau, Liaoning,
Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan. The central region includes Hebei, Shanxi,
Neimenggu, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hunan, Hubei. And the western region includes
Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Chongqing, Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xingjiang, Xizang.
Taiwan is not included in our analysis here.
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economic resources and favorable policies from the central government. In column (3) of
table 7, we construct a dummy for provincial-level and deputy-provincial level cities and add
it into the regression as an additional control. The dummy takes value of one when a city
belongs to a provincial-level or deputy-provincial level. When the dummy for provincial-level
and deputy-provincial level is controlled, the coe¢ cient of institutions is 4.249 and signicant
at 1% level. The dummy for provincial-level and deputy-provincial level is not signicant in
both stages. In column (4), we control the above two dummies in the regression at the same
time. We nd that only the coe¢ cient of institutions is signicant. The estimated coe¢ cient
of institutions is 4.393.
In the literature of empirical economic growth, the ratio between government consump-
tion and real GDP is a variable used to measure the extent of government involvement
(Robert Barro, 2000). In column (5), the ratio between government consumption and real
GDP is added as an additional control. The coe¢ cient of institutions is signicant and with
a value of 4.035. The ratio between government consumption and real GDP is not signicant
in either stage.
Investment rate is deemed to be an important issue for developing countries. We also
consider the investment ratio to GDP as the underlying factor. However, when we regress
our instrument on the investment rate in 2004, we nd that there is no signicant correla-
tion between the two. And when investment rate is added as an explanatory variable for
institutions, we nd that our instrument is still signicant in explaining the institutions at
the signicance level of 1%. In column (6) we report the result of adding investment rate
as additional control. We nd that both institutions and investment rate are signicant in
explaining the economic performance.
The results in table 7 do not support the argument that policy plays a more important
role than institutions in economic development. On the contrary, our results show that it
is the institutions rather than the government economic policy that accounts for Chinas
economic performance.
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3.8 CONCLUSION
Many economists believe that institutional change is a fundamental reason for Chinas im-
pressive economic performance during the last twenty years. However, since institutions are
widely believed to be endogenous, it is di¢ cult to evaluate their e¤ect. Following the method
developed by Mauro (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), and Acemoglu et al (2001), we try to iso-
late the exogenous part of the variation in the institution of property rights protection across
cities in China. We choose the enrollment in Protestant missionary lower primary schools
in 1919 as the instrument for Chinas present institutions. We believe that the enrollment
in Protestant missionary lower primary schools captures the extent of inuence by Western
countries in early 20th century. Since the central aspect of Chinas institutional transition is
learning from the West, the historical inuence by the West in early 20th century can persist
into Chinas current institutional change.
With the cross-city data in China, we use the two stage least square method (2SLS) to
estimate the e¤ect of institutions on Chinas economic performance. The results show that
there exists high correlation between the 1919 enrollment in Protestant missionary lower
primary schools and present institutions. The 2SLS estimate shows that institutions are
signicant in explaining the variation of economic performance among our sample of 47
Chinese cities. Our estimate resembles the result of Acemoglu et al (2001) in that the 2SLS
estimate is much greater than the OLS estimate. The signicance of institutions survives
robustness tests which control variables such as distance to the coast, historical human
capital and initial conditions for di¤erent cities.
The paper also illuminates the question of which element plays the most important role
in economic performance. We compare the e¤ect of institutions and that of geography and
government policy. By controlling geographic variables such as latitude, temperature, rainfall
and north-south di¤erentiation, we nd that institutions are signicant, while geography is
not signicant in explaining the variation of economic performance in our sample. When
we control the variables of government policy such as Chinas zone development policy,
coastal city policy and government consumption ratio to local GDP, the institutions are
still signicant, while government policies are not. Our results support the hypothesis that
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institutions occupy a central role in determining economic performance.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
sample mean minimum maximum
log GDP per capita in 2003 10.048 8.996 11.004
(0.4842)
institutions (average protection of 0.6506 0.5035 0.896
property rights 2002-2003) (0.0979)
1919 Protestant lower primary school enrollment 0.7225 0.0138 4.2022
(0.8465)
Note: The sample size for all variables is 47. The standard deviations are reported
in the parentheses under the means.
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Table 2: Instrument the Institutions in China
Panel A: The dependent variable is log GDP per capita
Institutions 1.921 1.522
(0.678) (0.726)
Protestant lower primary school enrollment 0.18 0.12
(0.08) (0.084)
R2 0.15 0.10 0.18
Panel B: The dependent variable is Institutions
Protestant lower primary school enrollment 0.044 0.036 0.051
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Distance to coast -0.007
(0.002)
Investment rate 0.272
(0.137)
R2 0.14 0.25 0.21
Panel C: The dependent variable is Protestant lower primary school enrollment
Distance to coast -0.0374
(0.027)
Total primary school enrollment 0.005
(0.02)
-1.961
(1.257)
R2 0.038 0.001 0.05
Note: Standard errors of estimated coe¢ cients are in parentheses.
***: signicant at 1%; **: signicant at 5%; *: signicant at 10%.
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Table 3: The E¤ects of Institutions on Economic Performance
Panel A: 2SLS
Institutions 4.230
(1.94)
Panel B: The rst stage
Protestant lower primary school enrollment 0.044
(0.015)
R2 0.14
F 7.77
Anderson canonical correlation LR test 7.491
p-value [0.006]
Notes: Panel A reports 2SLS estimates with log GDP per capita in
2003 as dependent variable, and Panel B reports the corresponding
rst stage. Standard errors of estimated coe¢ cients are in parentheses
and the p-values are in brackets. The result from overidentication
test reports the Sargans statistic.
***: signicant at 1%; **: signicant at 5%; *: signicant at 10%.
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Table 4: Robustness Test with Additional Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: 2SLS
Institutions 3.599 4.304 4.115 3.621
(2.184) (1.983) (1.954) (2.119)
Distance to coast -0.027 -0.021
(0.024) (0.021)
Total primary school enrollment -0.01
(0.013)
Initial condition (in 1985) 0.566 0.55
(0.542) (0.498)
Panel B: The rst stage
Protestant lower primary school enrollment 0.036 0.043 0.042 0.037
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Distance to coast -0.007 -0.005
(0.002) (0.002)
Total primary school enrollment 0.003
(0.002)
Initial condition (in 1985) 0.196 0.167
(0.064) (0.064)
R2 0.25 0.19 0.29 0.35
Notes: Panel A reports 2SLS estimates with log GDP per capita in 2003 as dependent
variable, and Panel B reports the corresponding rst stage. Standard errors of estimated
coe¢ cients are in parentheses.
***: signicant at 1%; **: signicant at 5%; *: signicant at 10%.
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Table 5: Robustness Test with Di¤erent Measurements of Institutions
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: 2SLS
Average Protection of Property Rights 4.23
(main specication) (1.94)
Comprehensive Institutional Index 5.546
(2.89)
Index for Government informal fees 2.42
(1.24)
Panel B: The rst stage
Protestant Lower Primary School Enrollment 0.044
(0.015)
Comprehensive Institutional Index 0.033
(0.018)
Index for Government informal fees 0.077
(0.029)
R2 0.14 0.06 0.12
Notes: Panel A reports 2SLS estimates with log GDP per capita in 2003
as dependent variable, and Panel B reports the rst stage with the listed
measurement of institutions as dependent variable for each specication.
In Panel B the explanatory variable is the instrument: the enrollment in
Christian missionary lower primary schools in 1919. Standard errors of
estimated coe¢ cients are in parentheses. The rst column is our main
specication in Table 3.
***: signicant at 1%; **: signicant at 5%; *: signicant at 10%.
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Table 6: Geography versus Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: 2SLS
Institutions 3.559 3.4 3.949 3.95 3.479
(1.874) (1.923) (1.867) (2.057) (1.932)
Latitude -0.016 0.034
(0.011) (0.06)
Temperature 0.027 0.712
(0.016) (0.079)
Rainfalls 0.026 0.004
(0.020) (0.032)
North-south Dummy 0.142 0.016
(0.178) (0.3)
Panel B: The rst stage
Protestant Lower Primary 0.043 0.042 0.045 0.04 0.042
School Enrollment (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Latitude -0.035 0.016
(0.225) (0.01)
Temperature 0.001 0.018
(0.003) (0.013)
Rainfalls -0.002 -0.006
(0.003) (0.005)
North-south Dummy 0.039 0.104
(0.027) (0.046)
R2 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.28
Notes: Panel A reports 2SLS estimates with log GDP per capita in 2003 as dependent
variable, and Panel B reports the corresponding rst stage. Standard errors of estimated
coe¢ cients are in parentheses. The north-south dummy takes value of one when a city
locates in northern China and zero when it locates in southern China.
***: signicant at 1%; **: signicant at 5%; *: signicant at 10%.52
Table 7: Policy versus Insitutions (2SLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Institutions 3.866 4.405 4.249 4.393 4.035 3.383
(2.294) (2.098) (2.167) (2.302) (2.291) (1.534)
West Dummy -0.413
(0.32)
East Dummy 0.056
(0.338)
Dummy for Coastal -0.119 -0.119
Open Cities (0.197) (0.198)
Dummy for Provincial or -0.004 0.002
Deputy Provincial (0.166) (0.165)
Gov. Consumption/GDP 0.999
(3.524)
Investment Rate in 2004 -1.438
(0.717)
Protestant Lower Primary 0.035 0.041 0.042 0.04 0.038 0.051
School Enrollment (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
West Dummy 0.055
(0.053)
East Dummy 0.107
(0.035)
Dummy for Coastal 0.04 0.039
Open Cities (0.03) (0.031)
Dummy for Provincial or 0.012 0.009
Deputy Provincial (0.028) (0.028)
Gov. Consumption/GDP 0.699
(0.51)
Investment Rate in 2004 0.272
(0.137)
R2 0.3 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.21
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Table 8: A1: Data Sources
Data Descriptions Sources
Log GDP per capita in 2003 Urban Statistical Yearbook
of China (2004)
Institutions (Average protection of property Ni et. al. (2004 and 2005)
rights 2002-2003)
Protestant lower primary school enrollment the Continuation Committee (1922)
(per 100,000 population in 1919)
Distance to coast Au and Henderson (2002)
Total primary school enrollment (enrollments the Continuation Committee
in missionary and government primary schools
per 100,000 population in 1919)
Initial condition Urban Statistical Yearbook
(Log national income per capita in 1985)7 of China (1986)
Latitude Au and Henderson (2002)
Temperature From various Provincial Statistical
Yearbook of China (2004)
Rainfalls (in millimeter) From various Provincial Statistical
Yearbook of China (2004)
Govt. consumption / GDP (2003)8 Urban Statistical Yearbook (2004)
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Table 9: A2: Main Data Used in the Paper
Cities Log GDP Insititutions (Average Instrument (Enrollment in
per capita Protection of property Protestant missionary lower
in 2003 rights 2002-2003 primary schools per 100,000
population in 1919)
Shenzhen 10.90678 0.716 3.354157
Wenzhou 9.714625 0.703 0.363966
Ningbo 10.39326 0.874 0.605413
Shanghai 10.75188 0.8575 0.867647
Jiaxing 10.15782 0.768 0.236241
Huzhou 9.857548 0.672 0.375335
Shaoxing 10.13122 0.8105 0.342742
Zhongshan 10.50819 0.6675 0.744186
Taizhou 9.800402 0.6095 0.202358
Suzhou 10.77254 0.7565 0.566417
Xiamen 10.46336 0.896 4.202231
Hangzhou 10.39876 0.716 0.807204
Qingdao 10.06041 0.824 2.674683
Beijing 10.3754 0.679 1.222187
Dongguan 11.00473 0.6365 0.707389
Zhoushan 9.780133 0.699 0.216511
Nantong 9.466841 0.7255 0.013829
Changzhou 10.17157 0.641 0.303127
Wuxi 10.67255 0.6825 0.32671
Quanzhou 9.820867 0.608 1.233659
Foshan 10.60767 0.646 0.141509
Nanjing 10.2149 0.7195 0.875139
Jinan 10.06858 0.633 0.336659
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Table 10: A2: Continue
Cities Log GDP Insititutions (Average Instrument (Enrollment in
per capita Protection of property Protestant missionary lower
in 2003 rights 2002-2003 primary schools per 100,000
population in 1919)
Huizhou 9.940687 0.558 0.148392
Guangzhou 10.78668 0.5265 0.81036
Yantai 9.914477 0.656 1.352353
Chongqing 8.996776 0.612 0.207788
Chengdu 9.800956 0.662 0.657268
Weihai 10.42709 0.5495 0.389025
Zhuhai 10.984 0.68 0.744186
Nanchang 9.573733 0.625 0.304401
Hefei 9.279866 0.5585 0.123119
Shijiazhuang 9.628261 0.614 0.033106
Dalian 10.28213 0.632 0.204756
Changsha 9.603058 0.5515 0.580194
Haikou 9.724959 0.5675 0.322727
Xian 9.411892 0.646 0.520519
Kunming 9.699656 0.5295 0.640646
Tianjin 10.18611 0.641 0.415557
Wuhan 9.973806 0.5035 1.198144
Fuzhou 9.929155 0.5805 2.4713
Shenyang 10.05496 0.5195 0.597351
Changchun 9.836546 0.58 0.133644
Qinhuangdao 9.563529 0.689 0.637698
Haerbin 9.607236 0.5325 0.26263
Zhengzhou 9.744668 0.517 0.19503
Xuzhou 9.20954 0.524 0.292204
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